PRAGMATISM CONSIDERS PHENOMENOLOGY

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INTRODUCTION AND REFLECTION

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A. *Introduction to the Texts*

For some time there has been a growing suspicion that pragmatism and phenomenology converge on common insights into the nature and dynamics of lived experience and its relation to the horizonal structures of the world. Yet certain misconceptions on both sides have kept these two vital movements from developing the proper conceptual realignment which would reveal the striking contour of this common ground. Phenomenologists generally regard pragmatism as vitiated by a naive biological account of a 'merely' problem solving organism in search of periodic stabilities. The ideological constraints of a supposed scientism further limit the descriptive power of a pragmatic account of experience. Hence biological reductionism and a narrow scientistic epistemology are held to blunt the reach and depth of pragmatic frameworks. On the other side, pragmatists generally regard the Husserlian program as falling prey to the Cartesian idealism which the early pragmatists rejected in their drive to undermine traditional dualisms. Further, Husserl's architechtonic understanding of scientific insight runs counter to the general theory of inquiry as it emerged from the perspectives of Peirce and Dewey. The priority of the subject and its constituting acts stand in opposition to a pragmatic perspective which would place such a 'subject' within the larger horizon of communal and natural transactions. On the surface it would appear that intended syntheses of these two movements are faced with categorial divides of great scope and recalcitrance.

On further inspection, however, this seemingly unbridgeable chasm between two of the most vital trajectories of the modern period reveals a rich terrain which stands beneath each perspective and lives as the nourishing soil for both. This terrain is currently under exploration by a number of thinkers attuned to the need for the delineation of landscape which has just begun to show its complex contour. The essays in this volume can be seen to represent the results of this initial survey of a

land long sensed but, until now, dimly perceived. For the most part, the forays were initiated from the side of pragmatism. Yet an assessment of the spoils returned indicates the immense subtlety and richness of the starting point. It is of especial interest that the writers presented in this volume have all developed both a reconstructed account of the pragmatic tradition and of the phenomenological movement. Perhaps it is no accident that the thinkers friendly to pragmatism tend to feel more at home in the writings of Schutz, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger than in the writings of the early and middle Husserl. Yet the appropriation of these thinkers is one which forces their own perspectives back toward a renewed account of the origins and dimensions of the lived experience which nourishes all probings into common traits. From out of this appropriation both movements can only benefit.

The first essay by Sandra Rosenthal, "Classical American Pragmatism: Key Themes and Phenomenological Dimensions," recasts traditional understandings of scientific method in such a way as to avoid some of the more common charges leveled against a pragmatism which utilizes such a methodology. The scientific method is not one which counsels a reductionistic metaphysics of mechanistic causality but one which stresses a "noetic creativity" which evidences the role of thought in going beyond that which is observed in common experience. The noetic power of scientific method enables it to honor and preserve the "qualitative fullness of lived experience." Hence, the assumed divergence between a pragmatism aligned with scientific method and a phenomenology concerned with tracing out the fields of signification and meaning is seen to be illusory.

Rosenthal exhibits four traits of scientific method which all attest to its fundamental creativity. The first trait of this method is that it arises out of ordinary experience and refers back to it. However, this secondary reflection on ordinary experience can never return to its origin in a naive non-mediated manner. Experience articulated is experience changed. Yet any rendering intelligible of ordinary experience derives its validation from traits manifest within ordinary experience. The second trait of scientific method is that it always exhibits the intentional unity between knower and known. Dewey's classic reconstruction of the reflex arc (1896) stands as a foundational document of this rethinking of the unity between organism and environment. The known is to some degree the product of noetic acts which determine the relevant trait contour of any object. Further, the shape of the self is largely dependent upon the shape of the complexes known. The third trait of scientific method is its functional and teleological organization of qualities and

qualitative fields. Our goal-directed activity establishes the mobile horizon within and through which objects are to become determinate and stable. Each intentional act serves the larger teleological drive toward partial wholeness and determinateness. So-called "qualities" can only be understood as consequent to methodic inquiry rather than as antecedent things-in-themselves. The fourth trait of scientific method is that it is prospective and self-corrective. Experience is constituted by a series of feed-back loops which serve to keep noetic creativity attuned to convergent structures within the phenomenal fields.

Rosenthal affirms that these four dimensions of noetic creativity emerge out of a phenomenological account of scientific method as it actually unfolds from within lived experience. Hence, pragmatism itself offers a phenomenological account of the noetic activity of science. Yet this account takes seriously the "hardness" and "bruteness" of a nature which sustains and ofttimes frustrates our noetic creativity. Disruptions and di-remptions are as much a part of experience as are the habits which emerge out of multiform biological transactions. The habits of mental life are themselves continuous with antecedent biological and natural structures which belong to other organisms within nature. The presence of both habit and disruption attest to the naturalistic foundation for any just account of experience. Rosenthal insists that pragmatic naturalism is not incompatible with a phenomenological account of the field of irreducible meanings. Rather, pragmatism provides the metaphysical horizon which locates some of the more narrow phenomenological descriptions of signification.

Pragmatic naturalism functions within a general processive understanding of the world. This metaphysical account of process is actually the foundation for any analysis of temporality or inner time sense within the subject. "Felt temporality" derives its proper categorical location form a pragmatic analysis of the general processes of an evolving universe. The metaphysical boldness of pragmatic naturalism does not rest upon spurious transcendental arguments which drive beyond experience to 'pro-duce' necessary and universal enabling conditions. This boldness derives from the dialectical traits of lived experience itself. Rosenthal insists that the exploration of lived experience shows such metaphysical categories as "qualitative richness, diversity, spontaneity, and possibility." The genius of pragmatism lies in its realization that our noetic creativity reveals fundamental traits not only of human subjectivity but of a processive universe. We must push through experience to the ontological features of the natural universe.

The second essay, by Charles Hartshorne, "An Anglo-American Phenomenology: Method and Some Results," criticizes Husserl's methodological notion that phenomenology must prescind from all presuppositions if it is to give a just account of so-called 'pure experience.' Presuppositions are both unavoidable and necessary if a non-trivial account is to be given of how experience occurs. The function of a non-Husserlian phenomenology is to account for the most relevant presuppositions which govern all understanding of reality. Any given observation, i.e., one not concerned with experience in its alleged universality and purity, must and will emerge from some definite theory or practical intent. Hence, Husserl's general problematic is vague and too indeterminate at the outset.

Hartshorne insists that several principles of formal logic provide us access to reality and experience in a way that is both necessary and universal. These modal analyses provide the framework within which more specific inquiries can occur. The first principle is that of "Dependence" (Peircean secondness) which asserts that successive experiences are dependent on antecedent experiences. The present is dependent upon the past and we must not assert an absolute distinction between logical and ontological dependence. This distinction is functional and reflects limitations in our finite human understanding. The second principle is that of "Contrast" which is related to Pierce's category of firstness. This principle states that relations can be independent of some of their terms and that genuine independence is real (thus complementing the first principle of dependence). One of the implications of this second principle is that something like Royce's notion of strict internal relation is rejected. This has obvious implications for a general metaphysical understanding of relational structures.

The third principle, "Asymmetry or Directional Order," shows in a striking manner the correlation between logical and ontological dimensions in a modal analysis. Symmetrical relations are merely special cases of the more pervasive nonsymmetrical relations. A nonsymmetrical dependence relation involves a directional movement which cannot be reversed or reduced to the antecedent. In logical terms we can assert that p is deducible from q while we may not be able to assert that q is deducible from p. The direction is not reversible. In ontological terms we may say that one event is derivable from another while the derivability cannot be reversed. Temporality 'intervenes' to change the relata and the meaning of their relation. The fourth principle of "Probabilistic Dependence" argues that future events have only a partial dependence on the past. Hartshorne asserts

that this is what Peirce should have meant by his category of thirdness. Any ontological, i.e., temporal, deduction from p to q must introduce probability. Any 'necessary' deduction is non-temporal and thus cannot carry ontological weight.

The fifth principle, "Objective Modality," deepens and rein-forces the fourth principle by establishing that time involves a directional order. Metaphysical determinism remains tied to the limited account of symmetrical relations. The more generic asym-metrical structures of relation preserve genuine freedom. The sixth principle of "Logical Strength" asserts that the logically stronger cannot be deduced from the logically weaker. This holds for ontological deductions as well. That state of affairs which is the weaker is the one which, in essence, conveys less information. Thus, for example, the statement that x is material is logically weaker than the statement that x is a table. The being of the table cannot be deduced from the being of matter. This priority of the logically and ontologically stronger gives scope for the intervention of freedom or decision between antecedent and con-sequent states. Since the consequent state is not deducible from its weaker antecedent condition, it follows that something novel has intervened.

The seventh principle of "Practical Reason" goes beyond Kant by stressing the absolute priority of practical reason in our concrete knowledge of experience and the world. Practical know-ledge utilizes the past in order to determine at least part of the evolving contour of the future. The eighth and final principle, the "Zero Principle," asserts that the experience of positive traits is more decisive for our understanding of the world than our experience of absent traits. While both experiences are neces-sary, the experience of positive traits enables us to make more general statements about the structure of the world as a whole. Yet this ascription of positive traits, while more secure than so-called negative knowledge, rests within a larger understanding of metaphysical fallibilism. This fallibilism serves to limit any overly aggressive ascription of a given trait to the whole of reality.

Hartshorne's modal analysis functions to provide the cate-gorical foundation for the subsequent phenomenological obser-vations which make the modal account more concrete. Specifically, he argues that any just account of experience must pay heed to Whitehead's fundamental insight that experience is a "feeling of feeling." From this it follows that experience is social and that a subject does have access to another subject's feelings. Husserl's solipsism (akin to that of Leibniz) is firmly rejected. In my feeling awareness I can directly intuit what another may be

feeling. A purely 'private' experience would be no experience at all.

Our access to the main traits of experience is improved when we take aesthetic experience as primary (a point missed by Husserl). Further, ethical and religious dimensions of experience are evocative of basic structures and point to the feeling dimension in all awareness. Experience is thus permeated by feeling and is open to the feelings of others. Hartshorne concludes his analysis by arguing for a basic realism which insists that experience is of real objects and not just of other experiences. Even dream experiences are, at the very least, of one's own body states at the time. Objects are present to feeling and cannot be bracketed out of a proper phenomenological account. The past itself is an intentional object of experience, not only through memory, but, more importantly, as present. The past and its objects are given in the present, this understanding of the richness of the present, and its relation to the other modes of time, takes us beyond the myth of the pure present.

The third essay, by John E. Smith, "The Reconception of Experience in Peirce, James and Dewey," shows how three major pragmatists developed a radicalized account of experience by criticizing and broadening classical British empiricism. This entailed the rejection of the epistemological starting point for an emphasis on experience as it actually shows itself to an active experiencer. James, as noted by Smith, was most aligned with the classical position and saw his own enterprise as one which developed several neglected dimensions in Hume's account of the "stuff" of experience.

Classical empiricism can be seen to affirm the following traits: the priority of the sensory element (and its separation from reason) within experience, that experience is of ideas rather than of objects, that experience is passive, and that experience is atomic, episodic, and has simples as its objects. Pragmatism, as understood by Smith, rejects these views in turn for an emphasis on relational and active dimensions of complex experience. The anti-Cartesianism of Peirce's early essays marks a divergence from naive intuitionism which has supported these classical conceptions of the knowledge relation. Further, the pragmatic emphasis on habit reinforces the natural and biological foundations of all forceful accounts of experience.

Turning to Peirce, Smith makes central the notion that experience is what is "forced" upon us by a world not of our own making. Compulsion is fundamental to the flow of experience and forces it to recognize certain general and repeated traits. Predication is tied to the forced element in experience and rests

secure in the connections which emerge from real objects and classes. Peirce, echoing Hegel's critique of Kant, asserts that experience is of things-in-themselves rather than of mere representations. Of course, Peirce's fallibilism prevents him from asserting that we have some form of Absolute Knowing in which the full and complete reality of things is attained in the present. This experience is permeated with a lively sense of the secondness or resistance of those objects which force themselves upon our apprehension.

Peirce rejects the notion that experience is nothing more than perception by his insistance that contrast and resistance are part of experience while not possibly being objects of perception. To deny these elements within experience as lived is to narrow by fiat the list of traits found within the evolution of finite experience.

One of Peirce's greatest insights was into the role and structure of so-called familiar experience. This pervasive and general horizon for more specialized scientific experience is rarely grasped as it unfolds within the subject. In Peirce's example, our own heartbeat is not an object of experience so long as it functions properly to sustain life. Yet it remains as a part of the general horizon within which any experience will occur. Peirce's repeated affirmation of critical common sense must be understood against the background of this dimension of experience. It is much harder for philosophy to articulate this dimension of experience than for the epistemologist to render intelligible the traits of refined experimental experiences. Hence, the resistance of experience to our categorical probings.

Turning to James, Smith places emphasis on the more classical dimensions of the *Principles*. James ties knowledge to an analysis of sensation, albeit a much broadened account of the qualities within sensation. Like Peirce, James draws attention to the "fringe" or horizon of experience which lies outside of immediate apprehension. The distinction between focus and fringe functions precisely to direct our attention toward the fringe, or as put in the late writings, the subconscious dimension of experience. This forces a categorical shift of great import for a more properly generic *and* nuanced account of human awareness.

James stresses the reality of connection, relation, transaction and tendency within the flow of experience. This shifts the emphasis toward the event quality that came to be called "pure experience." The function of an analysis of pure experience is to prescind away from precipitate distinctions between the experiencing subject and its intentional objects. As Smith shows, the drive toward the realm of pure experience is fraught with

difficulties which James was never fully able to overcome. At some level of analysis, the distinction between subject and object is essential. What is especially problematic is the role of the subject (of mineness) in the late writings of James. That experience is always mine is a fundamental affirmation of the *Principles*. This realization is blunted in the radical empiricism and the drive toward pure experience.

In reflecting on Dewey, Smith insists with ample evidence that Dewey is the most radical of the classical pragmatists in terms of a properly 'phenomenological' account of experience. The biological and social traits of experience become normative for understanding how any given experience fulfills its dynamic drive toward completion and, in aesthetic experience, fulfillment and consummation. Dewey rejects the classical notion of antecedent facts in order to affirm a transactional view which sees the "fact" as being the result of inquiry in the present and future. The full temporality of experience and its objects emerges within the instrumentalist analysis of knowledge.

Experience is both communal and shareable through forms a of communication not tied to simple assertive utterances. This communal dimension moves experience toward hoped for social convergence and has obvious political implications. It should be clear that Dewey's account of experience is tied irrevocably to a radical conception of democratic transaction in the forms of validation for experience. Experience thus discloses both nature and human community. The emphasis on the communal dimension of experience does, however, make many suspicious that Dewey does not have an adequate theory of the individual self. It is unlikely that this problem will receive a satisfactory solution through an analysis of Dewey's text's themselves.

Finally, Smith evidences the basic role of aesthetic experience for Dewey's account. Aesthetic experience, or the having of *an* experience, stands as the *telos* toward which all experience is moving. An experience is characterized as one which is fulfilled, consummated, completed, and filled with a qualitative integrity. In this fundamental kind of experience, the self and world interpenetrate in ways which go beyond the forms of experience tied to inquiry. Smith is surely correct when he points out that the analysis of aesthetic experience in the late Dewey saves him from collapsing human awareness into mere instrumental problem solving. In having an experience we redeem the claims of the present and allow a qualitative integrity to stand forth as an abidingness pure and simple. When Dewey's understanding of experience is read backward, as it were, from his account of

aesthetic experience, it promises to advance American phenomen-
ology into a far richer territory than was possible previously.

The fourth essay, by Beth J. Singer, "Signs, Interpretation,
and the Social World," utilizes basic concepts from the writings
of Justus Buchler and Alfred Schutz in order to develop a general
theory of signs which she claims is more generic in scope than
that developed by Peirce. The basic concept of the social world is
held to cover both human communities and the common sense world of
every day life. Singer is concerned with overcoming certain biases
in more traditional semiotics which distort the internal and
external reality of the social world. These misconceptions stem
from both an inadequate theory of judgement and from a misunder-
standing of the relation between judgement and interpretation.
Buchler's general metaphysics of natural complexes is held to
provide fundamental directives for overcoming these confusions.

Most writers in semiotics tie sign function directly to the
reference function. Yet, as Singer points out, certain signs,
e.g., connectives such as "and" and imperatives such as "Stop!",
do not refer to given complexes but stand alone, as it were,
without pointing to something other. A more properly generic
semiotics must allow for sign meanings which are non-referential.
The emphasis thus shifts from reference to the sign's relation
with other signs and interpretants.

Yet before semiotics can reach this more generic ground,
certain basic distinctions and reconceptions have to be made.
Singer utilizes Buchler's notion of the "natural complex" to
provide a universal categorical identification which situates
signs in a larger context. As Buchler affirms, anything discrimi-
nated in any way is a natural complex. A complex is an order of
related or relevant traits. These constitutive traits form the
"integrity" of the complex in a given order. At the same time, any
given complex will be located in other complexes, that is, will be
a constitutive trait (subaltern complex) in the other order or
orders. A complex thus locates traits 'within' itself and is
located by other complexes. Any complex can become a sign if it
becomes available for human judgement. In so far as a complex is
judged, it has meaning or meanings.

Buchler's general theory of judgement requires that we go
beyond assertive judgement to envision two other modes of judging.
Assertive judgments concern themselves with statements which pur-
port to be either true or false. The second form of judgment is
active judgment which involves human action or manipulation of
complexes or traits. Active judgments need not take the form of
propositions or function through any use of language. The third
form of judgment is exhibitive judgment, which involves the

manipulation of traits as ends-in-themselves. Art most frequently utilizes exhibitive judgement to display carefully discriminated traits in order to show a rich contour of qualities. It is important to note that each form of judgment has its own forms of validation. Any judgement, whether assertive, active, or exhibitive, must struggle toward some form of validation. It is clear that something like Dewey's notion of inquiry and instrumental validation remains tied to assertive judgments even though Dewey struggled to move his theory of validation into something akin to the other two modes.

A sign is, as noted above, any complex which has meaning. Yet a sign is not to be understood as a static repository of determined meanings. Rather, a sign directs further judgment so that interpretants will emerge to govern and direct the interpretation process. Hence an interpretation is concerned with interpretants rather than with signs per se. As Singer puts it, "An interpretation is a judgment that determines an interpretant." More specifically, an interpretant emerges from a judgment about a sign. This interpretant becomes available for further judgment and interpretation. The complex relationship between an interpretant and its sign is articulated or presented by an interpretation. While judgments are concerned with complexes, interpretations are concerned with the relation between any complex with meaning and its interpretant. It is perhaps helpful to see interpretation as a specific kind of judgment, a subclass.

Of fundamental importance for Singer is Schutz's use of Husserl's notion of "appresentation," which refers to the analogical or constructive process by which hidden dimensions of an object become available to intuition. Appresentation is not a process involving inference but one which produces a unity of intuition. To use Buchler's term, the "contour" of a complex, that is, its unity across numerous ordinal locations, is arrived at by a special form of intuition which 'fills in' the hidden or recessed dimensions. The use of appresentation is especially helpful when dealing with such realities as dreams or fantasies. A fuller sense of the contour of these complexes becomes possible through this special method of phenomenological seeing.

Moving beyond her analysis for Buchler and Schutz, Singer probes into the nature of interpretation and sign function. She introduces the notion of an "interpretive Scheme" to show that any interpretation must occur within an order of judgments which govern an order of interpretants. This scheme is the horizon within which any meaningful interpretation must take place. The order of signs delimited by the interpretive scheme is the "province of meaning." We can say that the province of meaning

represents the concrete signs which are the 'body' of the interpretative scheme. For Schutz, such a province is incommensurate with other provinces. It remains cut off from active interaction with other signs which might occupy a different domain. For Singer, any given province will interact with other provinces. It remains cut off from active interaction with other signs which might occupy a different domain. For Singer, any given province will interact with other provinces. The province may be a constituent in another province or it may share some of its signs with several provinces. In either case, some form of interaction is possible.

Returning to the problem of communication, Singer insists that the individual communicates with him or herself and with other members of the community. Further, in my reflexive communication I may, in fact will, belong to a large number of communities. The individual is thus the place where more than one community will prevail in its sign domain. All the modes of judgment are utilized by the individual in an attempt to stabilize these various sign communities into some meaningful contour. All signs are amenable to communication in some form and this essential communicability stands as the horizon for our ability to enter into alien provinces of meaning.

The fifth essay, by Richard J. Bernstein, "Heidegger and Humanism," locates Heidegger's 1947 essay *Letter on Humanism* against the backdrop of Greek and modern reflections on the nature and meaning of *praxis.* Heidegger's own efforts to overcome the history of metaphysics and its attendant humanism are seen to represent and extreme danger for practical human moral and political community. The American pragmatists are evoked as thinkers who made *praxis* central to philosophical speculation and who were thus in a stronger position than Heidegger to reveal the fundamental traits of authentic community.

Heidegger represents one extreme of a mood (*Stimmung*) which has become pervasive in the 20th century. Unlike the 19th century, with its belief in positive overcoming and qualitative birth or rebirth, our century is characterized by a spirit of negation and a sense of cultural entropy. Many thinkers evoke the end of metaphysics or the end of philosophy and its attendant culture while bemoaning the fate of technical selfhood. Both self and history are under an eclipse which shows no signs of ending. Rather a deepening of the midnight consciousness emerges as the horizon of our time. Heidegger's "rage against Humanism" must be seen as a particularly acute expression of this general malaise.

Ironically, Bernstein points out that the Heidegger of *Sein und Zeit* would feel at home with the classical American pragma-

tists on such issues as human finitude, the critique of subjectivity, the non-centrality of epistemology, and the emphasis on the necessity for prejudgments. Heidegger's rejection of the so-called technocratic essence of pragmatism deepens the irony. Heidegger's drive to overcome metaphysics, an extremely dubious notion, renders him unable to share with the pragmatists their deep commitment to social and moral *praxis*. In his writings on Aristotle, long appreciated by Gadamer, Heidegger blurs important differences between *praxis, poiesis, techne,* and *phronesis*. The failure to make appropriate distinctions blunts an insightful apprehension of the positive traits of *praxis*.

Heidegger lumps these Aristotelian distinctions under the one term of action (*Handeln*). Action is concerned with bringing about an effect, whether physical or moral. The essence of all action is found in a humanism which itself is but one expression of the essence of technology. The enframing (*Gestell*) of technology gathers human identity under its movement and reduces the human in persons to the merely controllable, The positive Greek understanding of *praxis*, and its relation to *ethos* and the *polis*, is ignored in favor of a view which disparages all so-called will-to-will. This rejection of the autonomy and the priority of *praxis* made Heidegger vulnerable to political currents which unleashed powers of evil on a scale which is still impossible to comprehend.

Bernstein takes pains to point out that serious efforts have been made by such thinkers as Dallmayr and Caputo to rescue a form of "higher" humanism from the Heideggerian texts. Yet this "higher" humanism, even with its positive emphasis on retrieval (*Wiederholung*), fails to give adequate weight to the reality of *Mitdasein* and the community which supports it. Neither *praxis* nor community play a role in the reconstructed Heidegger of these thinkers. It is clear that the negative appropriation of Heidegger by such a thinker as Derrida is fraught with difficulties. The deconstructive 'rage against metaphysics' is itself guilty of a profound anti-humanism which leaves us with little more than an extreme, and highly exaggerated form of relativism. It should be clear that the Heidegger of Dalmayr and Caputo is of greater value to us than the Heidegger of the deconstructionists.

Bernstein concludes by stating the points of convergence and divergence between the pragmatists and Heidegger. As noted above, the points of comparison are basic and pervasive. Both agree on the dangers of the metaphysics of subjectivity with its attendant emphasis on epistemology and its forms of validation. Both positions relentlessly strive to overcome those categorical dualisms which have vitiated the tradition of Western metaphysics. Both

perspectives insist that human beings exist *in medias res* and thus have neither absolute origin or predetermined *telos*.

Yet this partial list of common traits should not blind us to several profound differences between pragmatism and the writings of Heidegger. Chief among these are the pragmatic emphasis on the centrality of *praxis* and the pervasive commitment to the growth of critical community. Thinkers as diverse as Peirce, Royce, Mead, Dewey, and Buchler have all made human community central to philosophic reflection. By developing what can be called a metaphysics of community, the pragmatists and their heirs have provided ample room for a *true* humanism which vindicates the fundamental aspirations of finite selves in search of authenticity and moral regeneration.

The sixth essay, by Charles M. Sherover, "Royce's Pragmatic Idealism and Existential Phenomenology," shows a number of key parallels between Royce's Absolute Pragmatism and the basic categories of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*. Royce is discussed in the context of his diary notations and in terms of the metaphysical categories of his 1901 *World and the Individual*. Specifically, the notions of intentionality, sociality, and temporality are examined to show how Royce anticipated insights of the early Heidegger. Sherover maintains that Royce developed a more profound understanding of the role of sociality in determining individual reality than was possible for Heidegger with his emphasis on the priority of *Dasein* and its relation to nature and equipmental totalities.

Both Royce and Heidegger can be seen to work with a basically Kantian understanding of the role of categories in constituting human being and social structures. This Kantian legacy converges on the basic problems of intentional consciousness and its role in sustaining integral and coherent unities of experience. Further, both thinkers assume the priority of ontology in any reflection on the world or nature. While Royce does not raise the *Seinsfrage* as such, he does strive to locate anthropology and cosmology within the context of basic conceptions of Being.

Intentionality is understood to function within a teleological process in which an "internal meaning" of an idea seeks fulfillment in an "external meaning." Royce understands the internal meaning of an idea to be its purposive intent toward some form of external embodiment or confirmation. The finite self imposes its will by projecting these internal meanings onto a field of hoped for consummation. The emphasis on this internal dimension supports Royce's basic Idealism. The external meaning of an idea is its descriptive meaning. Traditional correspondence theories of truth grasp this side of the intentional relation. The teleo-

logical aspect of intentionality drives each internal meaning toward fulfillment in its proper external meaning. Royce states that the Absolute lives in the realm of fulfilled internal meanings (pertaining to its world of appreciation) while finite selves must move toward external expression. The intentionality of finite consciousness manifests itself in the movement from internal to external meanings. The will functions as the motor force for this movement.

Sherover points out that, contrary to common misconceptions, Royce did not posit a monistic Absolute but insisted, instead, on what Sherover calls a "pragmatic contextualism." This contextual view of reality rules out any 'block universe' which would stultify the teleological drive of the self. All intentional acts prevail within specific contexts which add to the life of the Absolute. Individuality is not eclipsed in Royce's general categorical scheme.

Royce advances four conceptions of Being in *The World and the Individual* in order to affirm the final position as the one leading toward truth. He rejects the perspectives of mysticism, realism, and so-called neo-Kantianism in order to prove the truth of the fourth conception. This fourth conception, perhaps best named as that of "Absolute Pragmatism," insists on the social and temporal dimensions of both the human self and of nature as a whole. Sociality is fundamental to the life of the Absolute, and this is itself normative for the life of the finite and time-bound self. Human self-consciousness is emergent out of the primordial sociality which exhibits systems of contrast that enable the self emerge in distinction from the not-self. We cannot start our reflection from the priority of self-consciousness but must derive any such 'starting point' from sociality itself.

Our awareness of human community, of the contrast between our self and those of others, is prior to our awareness of nature. This reverses Heidegger's understanding, which starts from *Dasein's* relation to the present and ready-to-hand inorder to move toward the social world of *Mitdasein*. Sherover insists that Royce has more clearly grasped the true starting point for our knowledge of reality. For Royce, echoing Peirce, nature is what is or will be known by the community of finite minds. The priority of community is established for both self-knowledge and the knowledge of science and metaphysics. Sociality is the most basic category in Royce's metaphysics as it serves to govern and locate categories of lesser scope.

Royce's phenomenological framework is most clearly manifest in his presentation of the traits of temporality. Like Heidegger, he sees temporality as the horizon within which the self can stand

into and before a world which becomes disclosed through time.
Royce drives beyond James' "specious present" to an understanding
of the conceptual priority of the three modes of time over the
perceptual present. The conception of past and future govern and
locate any experience of the present. Royce, like the pragmatists
in general, places priority on the future as that mode of time
which governs our intentional acts. Truth is not an antecedent
state but must await validation in the future convergence of the
community and the Absolute. Unlike some medieval thinkers, Royce
envisions the Absolute as itself part of an all-inclusive temporal-
ity rather than as something which stands outside of time in a
self-contained eternal present. Hence temporality and the time-
order characterize the life of the Absolute and of finite human
selves.

In Royce's later writings, especially his 1913 *The Problem of
Christianity*, the role of temporality and sociality is developed
along the lines of Peirce's triadic epistemology. Perception and
conception are united in the interpretation which manipulates
signs for both interpreters and interpretees. One can say that the
later Royce becomes even more phenomenological in his portrayal of
intentionality, sociality, and temporality as they function within
the community of interpretation. The metaphysical structures of
community guide the phenomenological descriptions of the interpre-
tive process. Sherover concludes that these metaphysical struc-
tures provide a grounding for concrete phenomenological inves-
tigations. Royce's systematic structure gives his perspective a
scope and power which remained out of Heidegger's reach. If
nothing else, Royce showed that a phenomenology bereft of meta-
physics was a phenomenology without depth and without a horizon.

The seventh essay, by John J. McDermott, "Experience Grows by
its Edges: A Phenomenology of Relations in an American Philosophi-
cal Vein," makes an impassioned plea for personal and moral
transformation through the extension and liberation of the rela-
tional networks which potentially surround us. Phenomenologists
and pragmatists can be understood to advance a method rather than
a conception of the universe. The methodic nature of these move-
ments makes them especially fruitful in the enterprise of esta-
blishing relations between selves and between a given self and its
personal universe. Human consciousness is unique in nature in its
ability to allow the world to interpenetrate into its evolving
life. This complex interpenetration is fraught with both novelty
and the deadening routine of mechanical habit. The function of a
proper phenomenology of relations is to help us emerge from the
confines of habitual structures which freeze the number of rela-
tional potentialities.

One forceful way to enter into an analysis of relations is through medical case studies of those extreme conditions which can befall the human organism on its way toward death. McDermott cites several such studies in order to reawaken us to the hidden richness of everyday being-in-the-world. The case of Lillian T. involves a woman who was revived after years of suffering from the devastating "sleeping sickness" which ravaged Europe from 1916 to 1927. Her every movement required complex prior planning if a successful outcome was to be expected. In the case of a brain-damaged soldier, Mr. Zasetsky, even the simplest feat of concentration was beyond reach. His detailed efforts to remember something as simple as a handshake evoke admiration and wonder at the effortless movements common to the majority of mankind. In extreme case histories such as these we are forced to recognize the utter complexity of those thoughts and movements which we so casually take for granted.

Philosophically, we can advance our understanding by taking note of the writings of James and Dewey. James both described and preached a Promethean self which has the task of building its own personal world of relations and meanings. Dewey, more skeptical of such hubristic optimism, insisted on the social and natural limitations of any human transaction with a world not of human construction. Yet Dewey affirmed fundamental dimensions of the Jamesian conception of the person, specifically, the power of the problem-solving self to reconstruct a lived world along the lines of its own felt desires. Going beyond James and Dewey, we must further locate the self in a larger social cosmology which attests to the utter plenitude and scope of the physical universe. No grasp of the self is complete which fails to account for the new physical cosmology.

Yet the growth of the Promethean self is not without its difficulties. Chaos and frustration await any self who tries to remake the universe out of whole cloth. Circumspection and wisdom must intervene to preserve the contour of the relational self. For McDermott, the greater danger lies in the deadening of relation which emerges from the imperial power of language and its substantive ascriptions of objective realities. James' radical empiricism shows us that objects are themselves secondary products of human attention and conceptualization and that these objects emerge out of a continuum which is ontologically prior. The continuum can be described as a relational network which has neither center nor circumference. Social and linguistic pressures keep this continuum from being a proper 'object' of personal and philosophic attention.

Of course, finite selves cannot hope or desire to have an unlimited number of relations. Some narrowing of pure possibility is necessary for biological and social survival. What is important, however, is that this narrowing serve genuine needs for preservation rather than the illusory drives of self-protection. McDermott analyses five negative forms of relationality which go beyond a genuine and healthy drive for proper limitation.

The first, relation-starvation, comes from a profound fear of the novel. The imperial power of repetition stands duty guarding the self against any relation which would bestir its illusory tranquility. This flight from new relations gives birth to the "incarnation of the *a priori*" which gives categorical sanction against that which would be new or novel. Other selves are seen as a threat to our assumed plenitude, and we project imperial biographies which reduce their novelty or greatness to accustomed models cut to our own measure.

The second, relation-amputation, radically cuts off newness. The twin compulsions of fright and habit conspire to keep the self within grooved patterns of response and identity. This entails a fundamental shrinking of the contours of the person.

The third, relation-saturation, goes to the other extreme in its drive toward stimulation and massive repetition of experiences which are neither deep nor long lasting. This "frenetic activity of multiple involvement" blunts the proper sociality of the self by reinforcing a deep solipsism. Quantity of experience becomes the measure of human existence.

The fourth, relation-seduction, is perhaps the most dangerous of the five. A "second fringe" beyond the ordinary becomes the lure and beacon for a self driven to leave the world of everydayness far behind. Religious or political messianism lift the self beyond common aspiration and blind it with a vision which is neither real nor valuable. When mind-altering drugs enter the mixture, the self may be forever beyond recall to the tasks of the real social order. These seductions do not forebode liberation but serve to deepen the addictive nature of relations beyond the pale.

The fifth, relation-repression, is attested to in psychoanalytic literature, which warns of the dangers of repressed contents. Nothing repressed can remain forever outside of manifestations through the 'cracks' in consciousness. As has been well documented, these repressed contents take on a life of their own and function as autonomous centers of power and affect. Whether through creative sublimation or through proper translation, these relations must find expression if the self is to avoid reversal and the humiliation of the irrational.

McDermott concludes with an affirmation, in spite of these dangers, of the need for an expanded world of relation. The self is presented with the existential task of building its own personal universe in the face of a larger universe of indifference and neutrality. Armed with insight into the dangers of the wrong type of relationality, the self can emerge into a world which vastly outshines the world of our own compressed isolation.

The eighth essay, by Charlene Haddock Seigfried, "Hodgson's Influence on James' Organization of Experience," traces James' interest in so-called "pure experience" back to the writings of British philosopher-psychologist Shadworth H. Hodgson. She cites a letter written by James in 1910 where he affirms that Pierce and Hodgson were the two major influences on his notion of pragmatism. James was especially attracted to Hodgson's emphasis on common sense and the conversion of the question of being to the question of what being is "known as." Hodgson is seen as a thinker who struggled to free philosophy from the Kantian legacy which would insist on the existence of a transcendental ego or transcendental unity of apperception as the basis of unity in the life of experience.

For James, the unity of the self could not be founded on something posited outside of experience as undergone. The philosopher could not appeal to a substantive self outside of phenomenal appearance, nor could the Kantian formal structures be introduced through a transcendental argument moving from what is the case to what must be the case in order to account for experience. James located the principle of unity in "passing thought" which tied together the modes of time as well as the the various thoughts isolated from the flow of experience. The ego, whether transcendental or empirical, emerges out of the passing thought as its own moment of present unity.

Both James and Hodgson rejected the Kantian notion that experience is chaotic until it receives unity from the formal structures of a constituting consciousness. Hodgson prefers to speak of a quasi-chaos *within* experience which must receive further orderliness through human intention. To talk of a chaotic manifold prior to experience is to engage in the type of speculation from which pragmatism sought to free itself. James affirmed that experience is already unified and organized in perception. Unity occurs within experience or not at all.

Seigfried maintains, against James, that the unity of experience must come from something besides "passing thought." James did not, of course, have a unitary account of the self in the *Principles*, but wavered between several possibilities. But he was correct in seeking that unity from within experience.

Hodgson, like contemporary phenomenologists, believed that we could examine experience without introducing presuppositions which come from a realm outside of experience. Further he insisted that we 'bracket out' the question of the agency behind experience. Such concerns must await a careful and thorough account of experience itself.

For James, this bracketing extended to the realm of metaphysical categories in general. The real is what which we find important and interesting. The unreal is that which fails to draw our attention. Yet James gives a broader definition of the real as that which is not contradicted by anything else which we think. From this weak definition we must assume that there are some things which are more real than others. Anything which does not generate contradictions is real while the more real is that which remains at the focus of our interest or attention. Beyond the problem of existence predication, James strove to return all metaphysical categories to their original appearance within common experience. No generic notion can emancipate itself from the stream of consciousness which gave it birth. Hence James envisioned pragmatism as a method for bringing speculative metaphysics back to its home base in finite experience.

James had another motive for attempting to return metaphysics back to the stream of consciousness. He insisted throughout that philosophic categories remain tied to real and vital moral issues. From this commitment he moved towards a conception of metaphysics which insisted on its practical import for giving meaning and direction to the self. Any given metaphysical category derives its validation not from formal argumentation but from its efficacy in turning a drifting and empty life into a meaning filled and future directed existence. His famous notion of the will or right to believe is part and parcel of this sense of the pragmatic value of general categories. The phenomenological dimension fo James can be most clearly seen in his effort, inspired by Hodgson, to show the origin of all metaphysics in the stream of consciousness, which is the spawning ground for all categorial systems.

The ninth, and final essay, by Thomas Olshewsky, "Toward a Hermeneutical Realism," argues that hermeneutic theory must overcome linguistic relativism if it is to advance more fully toward a proper understanding of the reality which confronts persons in their actions towards the world. Peirce's semiotics is held to provide a generic framework on interpretation which moves beyond the linguistic framework of both Gadamer and Habermas. In addition, the utilization of Peirce's three categories saves the act of interpretation from the nominalism an conventionalism which have vitiated all attempts to understand both texts and the world.

Philosophy, unlike theology, is engaged in a hermeneutics of hermeneutics whereby the main traits of the interpretative process itself are laid bare for our inspection. The classical view of hermeneutics is tied to a realism which drives towards a direct confrontation with the texts themselves. For someone like Martin Luther, Scripture interprets itself to the proper hermeneute along the lines dictated by the Spirit. By the time we arrive at the Romantic hermeneutics of Schleiermacher, the texts become problematic as interpretation shifts its interest to the inner spiritual evolution of the author. The intentions of the author become the genetic norm by and through which the text becomes open to our gaze. Schleiermacher locates the evolution of an author's thought within the evolution of a particular language. The Romantic movement stressed a hermeneutics which sought to divine the author, often with reference to 'unconscious' thoughts, better than the author understood himself. It was assumed that this process was capable of textual and psychological validation.

Dilthey's empiricist-historical hermeneutics, to a large degree based on Schleiermacher, struggled to find a form of validation appropriate for the *Geisteswissenschaften*. An intuitive emphasis on *Verstehen* attempted to find direct access to the mind of the author as that mind emerged out of concrete life. In many respect, Dilthey remained bound to the model of science from which he tried to free himself. He can be read as having tried to legitimate the domain of the human studies by a translation of methodology from the sciences of nature.

Gadamer moved Hermeneutics in the right direction by shifting from epistemology to ontology, that is, by moving towards an analysis of the structures of being-in-the-world as these structures show themselves in language. For Olschewsky, this shift advanced the study of interpretation beyond the previous stages. Yet Gadamer, like Schleiermacher and Dilthey before him, rejected a general semiotics in order to insist that all meaning takes place in language. No complex can show itself, can become unhidden, outside of the evocative Saying of language. Hermeneutics thus has language alone as its 'object.'

Peirce, utilizing a more forceful categorial framework, insisted that anything thought can function as a sign. Of course Peirce often hints that reality itself is nothing more than innumerable signs. In either case, signs can certainly exist outside of the natural human languages. Any complex can function as a sign provided that it convey something to someone in some respect. Peirce's semiotics is thus held to provide a more just account of the 'object' of hermeneutics than the linguistic accounts of the

Continental thinkers. The task becomes that of grafting semiotics to a non-linguistic conception of hermeneutics.

Any sign will exhibit all three of Peirce's categories. Of course, any given category may appear in degenerate form. Thus for example, a merely thought of possibility for action may contain secondness (resistance) in only a degenerate form while it may contain thirdness (generality) in a non-degenerate form. Regardless of the 'strength' of an instantiated category, it will be present in some respect.

Gadamer and Peirce do share several perspectives on the interpretive process. Both reject any form of Cartesianism which would insist on pure intuition into something like essences. Both reject the notion that interpretation has a presuppositionless starting point in a first sign or interpretation. And both, albeit it in different ways, make aesthetics primary for understanding interpretation.

Olshewsky's "hermeneutical realism" rejects the relativism and nominalism to be found continental thinkers. Gadamer, it is held, remains free from some of the more extreme implications of the "linguisticality thesis." That is, he places hermeneutics on a more secure, and potentially realistic, footing than do others. Yet his linguisticality keeps him from recognizing the existence of signs outside of language. Specifically, Peirce's three categories provide parameters within which any given interpretation must move. Nature functions as a system of seconds which limit the reach of any interpretive act. The world embodies firsts and thirds independently of our attempts to understand them. Any sign must exhibit all three categories and must exert its own forms of constraint on the hermeneutic process. Once this is recognized, we can leave behind the relativistic and idealistic hermeneutics of the past and advance toward a richer awareness of how our interpretations relate to a nature not of our own making.

B. *Through Temporality to Ordinality*

In the introduction to his 1913 work *Ideas*, Husserl takes pains to show how phenomenology stands opposed to the so-called "natural attitude." The attitude common to most philosophy and to the domain of the everyday assumes that the intentional objects of consciousness occupy different orders of being and that some complexes are more or less real than others. This ontological bias makes it difficult to move from the realm of facts to the realm of pure essentiality. Transcendental phenomenology utilizes an eidetic reduction in order to drive beyond the mere matter-of-fact and arrive at essential universality. Yet the success of this eidetic

reduction rests on a prior *epochē* which puts all ontological positing out of action so that the pure phenomenality of the phenomenon can appear. This bracketing (*Einklammerung*) shatters the power of the natural attitude, which insists on degrees of being:

> Indeed, what makes so extraordinarily hard the acquisition of the proper essence of phenomenology, the understanding of the peculiar sense of its problems, and of its relationship to all other sciences (in particular to psychology), is that, for all this, a new style of attitude is needed which is entirely altered in contrast to the natural attitude in experiencing and the natural attitude in thinking.[1]

The entrance into phenomenology proper is the *epochē*, which frees the quest for essence from any commitment to a peculiar understanding of complexes which would bypass one domain or order for another.

Husserl demands a "perfect freedom" for phenomenology which would universalize doubt about the existential status of any complex under investigation. What remains intact after the *epochē* is pure consciousness. The traits of any consciousness whatsoever become available to the specific kind of sight peculiar to phenomenology. From the self-evident foundation of the pure subject emerges all intuition into essences of whatever kind.

Methodologically it is clear that Husserl's return to the "things themselves" is facilitated by this rejection of the natural attitude and its ontological hierarchies. While he does posit hierarchies of essences, he refuses to intrude pre-thematic metaphysical hierarchies.[2] Every complex discriminated must receive full and detailed treatment if it is to show its proper trait contour. Physical objects do not assume priority over phantasy objects or ideational structures. The motive behind the *epochē* is the desire to be ontologically fair to any phenomenon regardless of its regional or ordinal location in some pre-reflective scale of nature.

Yet for all of Husserl's sensitivity to different ordinal or regional structures, there remains the perplexing problem of the "phenomenological residuum," the realm of pure subjectivity. Methodological fairness does not always foreclose metaphysical bias. The intention of the *epochē* is clear enough, yet its curious alignment with Cartesian subjectivity betrays its fundamental purpose. The priority of subjectivity distorts an otherwise judicious sensitivity to difference and ordinal placement. What is

required is a thematic sense of metaphysical fairness to support and encompass the methodological openess.

Husserl's intent to save the 'reality' of all phenomena no matter what their existential status is best fulfilled in a more properly metaphysical understanding of the equality of all complexes. This understanding emerges with greatest clarity in the categorial scheme of Justus Buchler when he contrasts ontological priority with ontological parity. Unlike the methodological tactic of bracketing, the metaphysical commitment to parity remains free from any bias toward the subject who might engage in such bracketing. There is no sought-for 'residuum' which would stand secure against the assaults of a puritanical drive against positing. No privileged location or complex emerges which would govern or locate the 'bracketed' intentional objects.

Philosophers traditionally assume that some complexes are more real than others, often confusing type of being with degrees of being. Pervasive throughout human history are versions of a commitment to ontological priority. This perspective makes probing into traits difficult because of a recurrent methodological bias toward those 'realities' which are permanent, inevitable, or spatio-temporal. For Buchler, this confusion is one which blunts the generic spread of any systematic articulation of the world:

> Philosophers, less concerned than men of affairs with making their world manageable and more with making it intelligible, develop types of trust and distrust comparable to those of common life. Some aspects of the world provide them with clues to other aspects. Some provide them with the impetus to build their guiding concepts. Those which they are compelled repeatedly to acknowledge, those to which they feel they are led back irresistibly in their interpretations, get accredited as "real" or "most real." Degree of explanatory usefulness gets transformed into degree of "being."[3]

Foundationalisms assume that translation into certain categorial primitives moves us from the less real to the more real. Method becomes the servant of metaphysical shortsightedness. Both reductive methodology and metaphysical hierarchy conspire to narrow the reach of cumulative human probing. A privileged perspective makes it difficult to render account of novel or vagrant complexes.

In strict contrast to ontological priority is the sense of ontological parity. For Buchler, the *poet* comes closest to this difficult but fundamental sense of ontological parity:

Some complexes may have more or less importance, more or less pervasiveness, more or less moral significance, more or less interest, for the poet; but none has more or less being than any other. The poet's working attitude is an acceptance of ontological parity. "Acceptable" is the term rather than "assumption." Ontological parity does not function for the poet as a theoretical commitment or assertive presupposition. It functions as an unwillingness to deny the integrity of any complex discriminated.[4]

Poetic query insists that any trait discriminated is as real as every other. Of course, one trait may be real in a very different way than another. Yet this difference is not one which pertains to degrees of being.

The import of this realization should be obvious. Phenomenology, like the poetic attitude, represents a commitment to ontological parity. No phenomenon, no matter how tenuous or 'unsubstantial,' should be precluded from sustained analysis and articulation. Any intentional object has 'being' in so far as it is available to noetic consciousness. To deny the reality of any phenomenon is to let ontological priorities foreclose query.

Unfortunately Husserl's *epochē* only carries us part way toward the proper sense of parity. The refusal to allow any "positing" of being curiously reinforces the primacy of pure subjectivity and its assumed transcendence of the world. Husserl fails to apply the insight into parity to the 'residuum' which remains intact after the *epochē*. His critique of the natural attitude violates a more profound naturalism which would insist on the locatedness of the self in complexes of unlimited complexity and scope. To bracket the world in order to preserve the integrity of phenomena is to subvert a proper sense of methodological fairness for a hidden, and highly destructive, metaphysical privileging.

What is desired is a categorial clearing of unlimited scope and power which would give us access to any trait or complex no matter what its ontological location. The sense of parity is absolutely basic to any judicious articulation of the world and nature. Husserl's' Cartesianism occupies a redoubt from which only shortsighted expeditions may embark. A less confined categorial location must be sought which would allow for unlimited movement in all directions. Before this clearing can be articulated, several further steps must be taken.

We will take our initial clues from another perspective, that of Heidegger. Shortly after the publication of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger gave a series of lectures later published as

Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. Initially given in 1927, these lectures represent an advance beyond the concepts of "World" and "Worldhood" as previously articulated in *Sein und Zeit.* The analysis of these notions required an understanding of temporality and its relation to Dasein's openness to anything whatsoever. Our concern in what follows will be to show how Heidegger's articulation of the concepts of World itself violates the sense of ontological parity. Temporality will be shown to be an inadequate horizon for understanding our being-in-the-world. The phenomenon of ordinality will emerge as the ultimate categorial clearing which locates both Temporality and the phenomenon of the "Worldhood of the World."

In *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger grounds his understanding of care (*Sorge*) in the three ecstatical modes of Temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*). In the movement from inauthentic to authentic being the modes of time become transformed. In inauthentic existence time is experienced as awaiting (future), presentation (present), and oblivion (past). The richness of temporality becomes reduced to a truncated and flattened understanding of beings and Being. In authentic existence time is experienced as anticipation (future), the moment of vision (present), and repetition (past). Heidegger took St. Paul's eschatological account of fulfilled time quite seriously in the late 1920's and strove to develop a phenomenological account of the primitive Christian understanding of expectation. Like Paul Tillich, who showed the political implications of eschatological time in his brilliant work *The Socialist Decision*, Heidegger recognized that a transformed relation to time would alter human nature on its most fundamental level.

Authentic Temporality, with special attention to the anticipatory resoluteness which would gather us fatefully toward death, became the horizon by and through which human nature could be recaptured from the tyranny of the everyday. In utilizing such notions as *kairos* and *Augenblick* Heidegger advanced beyond the chronological notion of time inaugurated by Aristotle. Temporality became the thematic clearing for any human understanding of beings or Being.

The world in its Worldhood was rendered intelligible through an analysis of the equipmental totalities (*Zeug*) which radiate outward from our various pre-thematic involvements. By articulating the traits of the ready-to-hand, the present-at-hand, and the being with others (*Mitdasein*) Heidegger built up a conception of the World as a phenomenon in its own right. *Dasein's* access to this world was itself made possible by the fundamental clearing

provided by Temporality. The ecstases of Temporality were seen as the basic moments of 'holding-open' which allowed for the un-veiledness of any beings whatsoever.

By 1927 Heidegger had come to focus more specifically on the nature of the Worldhood of the World. In *Die Grundprobleme* he attempts to reveal the inadequacies of traditional accounts of that phenomenon which is neither *a* being nor Being itself.

A glance at the history of philosophy shows that many domains of beings were discovered very early – nature, space, the soul – but that, nevertheless, they could not yet be comprehended in their specific being. As early as antiquity a common or average concept of being comes to light, which was employed for the interpretation of all the beings of the various domains of being and their modes of being, although their specific being itself, taken expressly in its structure, was not made into a problem and could not be defined.[5]

Orders, and their attendant traits and subaltern configurations, emerged from ancient speculation in an array which has changed but little. Yet the problem of the being of that which 'governs' these domains has remained in eclipse. The issue is not only that of the ontological difference between Being and beings but that of the full phenomenality of the World and its ordinality.[6] Temporality still remains as *the* horizon for our understanding of the World yet the phenomenon of Worldhood has become more thematic.

In *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (1929), Heidegger gives a condensed account of the categorical reflections of *Die Grundprobleme*.[7] Specifically, he radicalizes the concept of the World in such a way as to go beyond any understanding which would see the World as the mere totality of what is. He compresses his analysis into four aspects:

1. World means a *How of the being* of Being rather than being itself. 2. This How defines being *in its totality*. It is ultimately the possibility of every How as limit and measure (*Mass*). 3. The How in its totality is in a certain way *primary*. 4. This primary How in its totality is itself *relative* to human *Dasein* Thus the world belongs strictly to human *Dasein*, although it encompasses (*umgreift*) all being, *Dasein* included, in its totality.[8]

The How (*Wie*) becomes the encompassing clearing through which the complexes *of* the world become available to *Dasein.*[9] Let us analyze these four points in turn.

The World as a phenomenon is neither a being nor Being itself. As such it stands between both extremes of the ontological difference. Since the world is not a complex it cannot be understood in terms applicable to beings or complexes. World is the How through which any complex or order becomes intelligible. The How of the world *locates* beings.

Secondly, the World governs beings (complexes) in their totality. This is not to reduce the World to the totality of all complexes but to show it as the measure for complexes. When we say that the world is the limit (*Grenze*) for beings we mean to affirm that it is the non-located location for any complex whatsoever. Any given being will, of course, be regionally located. Heidegger's understanding of the history of philosophy gives priority to the orders (space, matter, etc.) which have emerged as primary for human reflection. Each order is governed by a regional ontology with its own regional a priori structures. Yet 'beneath' these orders is the World which locates both beings and their attendant orders.

Thirdly, the How of the World is primary. That is, it is foundational for any understanding of beings and their orders. Categorial reflection drives inward from both sides of the ontological difference to make Worldhood primary for holding-forth the between which sustains the poles of the difference.

Finally, this How of the World is relative to the human *Dasein.* This is not to assert that the World is dependent upon *Dasein* for its being or its How but that it becomes unhidden as a phenomenon only for *Dasein.* Yet the World also stands as the encompassing for all beings including *Dasein.* It both encompasses and measures all complexes.

Returning to *Die Grundprobleme*, we can see how the concept of the World is tied to an understanding of *Dasein* and Temporality:

Since the world is a structural moment of being-in-the-world and being-in-the-world is the ontological constitution of the *Dasein*, the analysis of the world brings us at the same time to an under standing of being-in-the-world and of its possibility by way of time. Interpretation of the possibility of being-in-the-world on the basis of temporality is already intrinsically interpretation of the possi blity of an understanding of being in which, with equal originality, we understand the being of the *Dasein*, the being of fellow-*Daseins* or of the

others, and the being of the extant and handy entities always encountered in a disclosed world.[10]

Temporality grounds our understanding of *Dasein* while the World is seen to be only part of the larger 'phenomenon' of being-in-the-world. Temporality thus remains as the horizon for any understanding of beings, Being, and World. The ready-to-hand (handy) and fellow *Daseins* become available to us only through temporality.

Dasein is the only known being who exists within the three ecstases of Temporality. *Dasein* is thus ontologically prior to any other complex within the World. Its own trait structure becomes normative for any understanding of beings of whatever constitution. Heidegger does not, of course, project anthropocentric categories onto pre-human complexes. Yet his emphasis on the absolute priority of the *Dasein* and its unique Temporality does preserve an ironic chapter in the history of Cartesian metaphysics. The concept of the Worldhood of the World remains tied to an anthropocentric and privileged complex. In order to exhibit this bias more forcefully we must examine another understanding of the phenomenon of World which does not give ontological priority to the human and its unique traits.

In his watershed article, "On the Concept of 'The World,'" (1978), Buchler criticizes several traditional notions pertaining to the nature of the World. Chief among these are: the World is a totality, the World is the overarching unity, the World is the overarching continuity, the World is an organism, and the World is a machine. Each of these views betrays metaphysical problems of great recalcitrance. Yet each view in turn struggles to preserve some sense of the encompassing nature of the World as opposed to that which is encompassed by the World. Positively put:

> The World provides conceptually what is greater in scope, incomparably greater, than anything "in" it or "of" it. But this contrast imposes itself even where the emphasis, plurally, is on worlds. A distinguishable or circumscribed world is yet indefinitely greater in scope than any discriminandum of that world.[11]

Both 'the' World and a world are encompassing of any order or trait isolated by human probing. This sense of encompassment is fundamental to an initial grasp of the Worldhood of the World. Buchler, like Heidegger, insists that the phenomenon of the World is unique. No analogies from specific orders or traits are applicable to the notion of Worldhood itself.

Traditionally, spatial analogies function to reinforce some notion of the World as an aggregate or as a container. The astronomical orientation has served to produce serious problems for a metaphysical understanding of the phenomenon of Worldhood. A just and generic account must move beyond spatial analogies. Can we say, for example, that possibilities are "in" the World in the same way that spatio-temporal particulars are? And what sense would it make to say that the World is itself "in" something more inclusive? Some complexes are spatial and some are not. The World in its Worldhood is neither spatial nor temporal. Process metaphysics imposes a similar confusion when it elevates the notion of epochal time to a fundamental trait of Worldhood. Whatever the World is, it is not 'the space of spaces' or 'the time of times.'

It should be clear that the World cannot be located by something more inclusive. While *a* world is located in other worlds, and locates subaltern worlds within itself, 'the' World has no primary or extrinsic location. Buchler states:

> The World cannot be located, for it would have to be located in an order which would be more inclusive. The World cannot be included, for it would then be not the World but one more order, one more sub- complex. The World cannot be environed, as every order can and must be, for that which environs would be a complex distinctly additional to the World – an absurdity.[12]

In striking parallel to Heidegger, Buchler denies that the Worldhood of the World can be understood in terms applicable to a being or a complex. World stands between complexes and the Being (prevalence) which 'sustains' them. Its unique phenomenal status requires alternative categorial articulation.

To advance a more positive definition, the World can be seen as "innumerable natural complexes" with no correlative integrity or 'shape.' The World cannot have a collective unity or contour but stands as the clearing 'within' which any complex can become known. We cannot isolate any one order, say the order of the *Dasein*, and make that order primary in all respects. Buchler states, "Since the Innumerable Complexes do not constitute an Order, and since in consequence no order has an 'ultimate' location, it follows that no order has absolute priority over any other."[13] The phenomenon of the Worldhood of the World can be exhibited without any reference to persons or their internal forms of Temporality or time consciousness. Any complex, when rendered

metaphysically intelligible, provides us access to that which is not a complex. While it is clear that persons have a unique openness to the World it does not follow that the categorical articulation of this phenomenon requires an analysis of the traits of persons.

Heidegger's insistence on the absolute priority of *Dasein*, as a constituent in the complex of being-in-the-world, returns to a muted subjectivism which darkens the generic drive toward a fuller understanding of Worldhood. Buchler's methodic and metaphysical utilization of ontological parity prohibits the notion of a privileged order or complex.[14] It is significant the Buchler advances his concept of the World *without* reference to human existence. Worldhood can be articulated without benefit of those categories which are applicable to persons, or, in Buchler's language, to "proceivers."

The Worldhood of the World, as a primary phenomenon, emerges into its own true measure when the traits of *Dasein* are bypassed for categories of greater generic encompassment. Temporality may be *part* of the access-structure of human dwelling but it is not constitutive of Worldhood itself. The most generic categorial clearing for gaining access to Worldhood is that of *ordinality*.

Buchler takes pains to distinguish between the Innumerable Orders constitutive of the World from the fundamental ordinality which stands as the ultimate dimension of Nature. In his 1978 essay, "Probing the Idea of Nature," he makes this distinction:

> The conceptions of nature as providingness and as ordinality are continuous with one another and with the conception of nature as "orders." This continuity can be conveyed by utilizing both members of the twin *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. Nature as ordinality is *natura naturans*; it is the providing, the engendering condition. Nature as "orders" is *natura naturata*; it is the provided, the ordinal manifestation, the World's complexes.[15]

When we probe more fully into the phenomenon of the Worldhood of the World it becomes necessary to work through this distinction in such a way as to come closer to what Heidegger has called the *How* of the World.

World is neither an aggregate of enumerated complexes nor the Being which would somehow stand 'behind' complexes as a creative or ejective power. It stands between complexes and the ordinality which governs them. Nature and World can be differentiated from each other through the reappropriation of Spinoza's distinction

between nature naturing and nature natured. Heidegger has
understood both sides of the distinction but in a manner which
does not achieve the level of clarity desired.

Nature is the ordinality which provides the innumerable
complexes of the World a 'place' within which to arise and
function. The World is the engendered complexes themselves. The
phenomenon of the Worldhood of the World encompasses both
dimensions. The engendering condition *for* the World's complexes is
prior to any engendered complex itself. Providingness is certainly
'more' than the 'sum' of all providings within Nature. It is best
seen as "bringing forth" or as "sheer geniture" rather than as an
agency behind the World. This providingness encompasses any
provided or engendered traits yet it is not itself an order or
complex.

Ordinality, as another name for the providing, for
providingness, is the fundamental dimension of Nature. Further, it
is prior to the Innumerable complexes of the World because 'it'
abides as the seed bed for what does emerge as *a* world or as *a*
complex. Ordinality embraces the World's complexes by freeing them
for their proper manifestation as orders. Returning to
Heidegger's *Die Grundprobleme* we can appropriate his re-
fashioning of Aristotle's understanding of time for our
understanding of ordinality:

> If we remain with the image of embrace, time is that
> which is *further outside*, as compared with movements and with
> all beings that move or are at rest. It embraces or *holds
> around* the moving and resting things. We may designate it by
> an expression whose beauty may be contested: time has the
> character of a *holdaround*, since it holds beings – moving
> and resting – around. In a suitable sense we can call time,
> as this holder-around, a container, provided we do not take
> "container" in the literal sense of a receptacle like a class
> or a box but retain simply the formal element of holding-
> around. [16]

Ordinality is "outside" of the orders which constitute the
World. Yet its being–outside does not remove the World from it. It
holds around all complexes and embraces them in their unfolding
and withering. To call this *holdaround* "time" is to extend too
much metaphorical charity towards a concept of only limited
applicability. There are orders which are not held around by time,
no matter how time or temporality come to be understood. Heidegger
comes closer to a proper understanding of the holdaround when he
rejects spatial or container analogies. What is unclear is the

reason behind the insistence that temporal analogies or metaphors are sufficiently free from order--specific connotations.

The holdaround of temporality is but one element of the holdaround of ordinality. The later notion is the more generic and stands as the encompassing measure for the former. Ordinality stands even "further outside" than temporality. As such it is the Encompassing itself.

Ordinality and the Encompassing itself are actually the same phenomenon from two different perspectives. Our concluding remarks will concern themselves with showing how this is the case.

Ordinality stands as the *measure* for the World's complexes. This is not to say that ordinality "locates" complexes in the same way that orders locate and are located. Rather, ordinality measures and enables complexes. As the enabling 'ground,' ordinality makes all arising and dying possible. No complex can be non-ordinal. Each complex will have an "ordinal environment." This environmentality is fundamental:

> The foregoing conception of nature means that no complex can be   regarded as, so to speak, transcendentally free-floating, as non ordinal, as superseding all orders. It means, for example, that what   are labelled as fictions, illusions, and contradictions also have an   ordinal environment and an integrity or integrities, whether these be verbal or logical or emotional. It means that nothing is "contrary to   nature," nothing distinctively "in accordance with nature."[17]

On one side, no complex can extricate itself from its ordinal environment or its relation to ordinality. On the other side, ordinality remains bound to that which is ordered, to orders in their unlimited complexity. Ordinality encompasses the innumerable orders of a World which has no ultimate shape or contour. Any given complex (order) will stand under a dual encompassment. A complex is encompassed by other complexes; is located in an order of larger scope. But a complex is also encompassed by the ordinality which stands as the provision of traits and orders.

While it is easy to see how a complex stands under this dual encompassment, it is less clear how the World in its worldhood relates to the Encompassing. For if the World, as Innumerable complexes, has no shape or 'outer' contour, it makes no sense to speak of that which encompasses the World. 'Where' would the encompassment occur?

We have an initial clue guiding us to the heart of this problem. Earlier we spoke of ordinality, of Nature in its

naturing, as that which is the "holdaround" of the World's complexes. Yet we also indicated that this holding around is not to be identified with the notion of ordinal location. It is not something which somehow lifts itself completely 'outside' of the World's complexes. What is needed is an understanding of ordiality which evokes a proper sense of the Encompassing.

Ordinality is the *measure* for the orders under its care. It measures without at the same time being measured. This measuring is not that of a spatial system which assigns a given three- or four-dimensional place to that which is measured. It cannot be a static or atemporal fore-structure for the "in" relation. Yet ordinality cannot in turn be measured. It would make no sense at all to speak of the contour of ordinality. Ordinality has even 'less' of a contour, if a descriptive license may be allowed, than the World. Ordinality resists being measured or encompassed. The Encompassing is that side of ordinality which cannot be measured. Ordinality is that side of the Encompassing which lives as the providingness of all complexes. The phenomenon itself may perhaps be best described as the measureless measure which provides traits. This measureless measure provides for the arising of persons, temporality, spatiality, and all complexes outside of the human.

The Encompassing is not arrived at through a transcendental argument which would posit some hidden structure to account for that which is manifest. The Encompassing is present to complexes whenever they 'recognize' (if we may stretch this psychological notion) that they do not stand as their own measure but receive their measure, their being measured, from that which is without a measure. Philosophy can be best understood as the movement toward encompassment. Each addition to our categorial stock deepens the sense of generic spread. Philosophers would better serve their chosen craft if they would recognize the encompassing lure which lives within the very act of philosophizing itself. As we move through orders to the World, as we move through the World to ordinality, and as we move toward the Encompassing which lives at the heart of ordinality, we experience that measureless measure which provides the very 'space' within which thought moves. The lure of the Encompassing is the fundamental clearing-away which gives us World. Would it not behoove philosophy to open *itself* to this lure.

NOTES

1. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. by F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), p. xix.

2. pp. 24-25.

3. Buchler, *The Main of Light*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 124.

4. p. 126.

5. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. by Albert Hofstadter, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 22.

6. For another discussion of this issue see my "Naturalism, Measure, and the Ontological Difference," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, XXIII, No. 1 (1985), 19-32.

7. The important internal relation between his *Die Grundprobleme* and *Vom Wesen des Grundes* was pointed out to me by Dr. Raymond Gogel, who has worked on problems parallel to those treated here. See his *Quest for Measure: The Phenomenological Problem of Truth*, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1987.

8. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons*, trans. by Terrence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 51.

9. We have been using the words "being" (*Seiendes*) and "complex" interchangeably throughout. However, the notion of the natural complex, "complex" for short, is the more generic of the two. The concept "being" often has the conotation of spatio-temporal particularity which the concept "complex" avoids.

10. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 294.

11. Justus Buchler, "On the Concept of 'The World'," *The Review of Metaphysics*, XXXI, No. 4 (June, 1978), 556.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 573.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 576.

14. The methodic side of ontological parity is found in Buchler's utilization of his general concept of query. For an elaboration of query see his *The Concept of Method* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961). This work has recently been reprinted by University Press of America.

15. Justus Buchler, "Probing the Idea of Nature," *Process Studies*, III, No. 3 (Fall, 1978), p. 165.

16. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 252.

17. Buchler, "Probing the Idea of Nature," p. 165.